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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CENSORSHIP OF MOTION PICTURES FOR
PuBLIc EXHIBITION -S TATUTE NOT FURNISHING A REASONABLE

GUIE. - R.K.O. v. Department of Education of Ohio, . . . Ohio
St. .

. .,

122 N.E.2d 769 (1954). Plaintiff was engaged in the pro-

duction and distribution of motion picture films in the State
of Ohio and elsewhere. The division of film censorship of the
department of education issued an order requiring the plaintiff
to eliminate certain parts of a motion picture film prior to its
distribution and exhibition in the state. Plaintiff instituted the
present suit in the Supreme Court of Ohio, praying that the
court vacate and set aside the order of the division on the grounds
that the censorship act was repugnant to the first and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution as well as similar provisions of
the constitution of Ohio. The Ohio censorship statute provides that
only pictures which are "moral, educational, or amusing and
harmless" shall be approved for public exhibition. OHIO GEN.
CODE ANN. § 154-47b (1946). Thus the court was presented with
the problem of determining whether or not, or to what extent,
a state in its sovereign capacity could censor the public exhibition of movies without violating the due process requirements of
its own and the Federal Constitution.
The plaintiff was granted the relief prayed for, the court determining that, in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the censorship statute was unconstitutional. However, the court was prevented from declaring the
act unconstitutional because only five justices concurred in the
opinion, whereas a rule of the court required six members to
concur before the invalidity of a statute could be established.
In the alternative, the court held that any censorship order made
pursuant to the present statute would be per se unreasonable and
unlawful and therefore could not be enforced.
Prior to 1952, the Supreme Court indicated that motion pictures
were not among those forms of expression protected by the due
process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). However, the Court expressly reversed its position and, by so doing,
stimulated renewed interest in this field when it declared that
"....

expression by means of motion pictures is included within

the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
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495, 502 (1952). The Burstyn case, supra, perhaps better known
as the court test of the moving picture "The Miracle," reached
the Supreme Court as a result of a refusal by the regents of the
State of New York to allow the showing of the movie on the
ground that it was "sacrilegious," one of the standards provided
by statute. This action by the regents was affirmed by the state
court, but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed on the
grounds that no moving picture could be subject to censorship
by such an uncertain and indefinite standard. "Sacrilegious," as
a statutory standard was too broad, tending to vest the censors
with an unlimited discretion in its application. The Court qualified its position by stating that the protection afforded by the
Constitution did not extend to all kinds of movies and pointed
out that if it had been presented with a clearly drawn and definite
statute designed to prohibit the showing of obscene films, the
result might have been different.
One week later, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
of a Texas city on the authority of the Burstyn case, supra. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952). The ordinance empowered the
city board of censors to refuse a license to exhibit a movie if such
exhibition would be "prejudicial to the best interests" of the
community. The appellant had been convicted of a misdemeanor
under this ordinance for showing a motion picture without a
license. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in a memorandum decision and ordered the appellant discharged. In a
separate opinion, Justice Frankfurter, concurring with the court,
expressly stated that the ordinance under attack was violative
of due process because of indefiniteness.
Notwithstanding the fact that the standard of "sacrilegious"
in its censorship act had been declared invalid in the Burstyn
case, supra, the New York Court of Appeals once again upheld
a decision of the board of regents to refuse a license to show
the movie, "La Ronde," on the grounds that it was "immoral"
and "would tend to corrupt morals." Commercial Pictures Corp.
v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953). The
state court, attempting to save the statute, interjected a new
aspect into its reasoning when it applied the clear and present danger test to motion pictures, that is, if a movie presents such a danger of "substantive evil to the community," then it is within the
power of the legislature to protect the community from the
evil, even though in doing so it may infringe upon the right of
freedom of expression. The court considered any act of the legislature in this regard to be a reasonable and valid exercise of
the police power of he state, and therefore, where the evil is a
motion picture that threatens the morals of the community, any

19551

RECENT DECISIONS

protective measure taken by the legislature must necessarily include some form of censorship. Applying the requirements of
due process to the statute itself, the court construed the standards applied in this case, "immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals,"
to refer clearly to sexual immorality, and as such they were
thought neither vague nor indefinite.
At about the same time the Commercial Pictures Corp. case,
supra, was being decided in New York, the Supreme Court of
Ohio was confronted with a similar problem in Superior Films,
Inc. v. Departmentof Education, 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311
(1953). Here the censors had refused to issue a permit to show
the motion picture "M" because they believed the picture was
"harmful." The court concluded that not all state censorship
statutes had been outlawed by the United States Supreme Court,
and that there was still a certain field within which the decency
and morals of the community could be protected from offensive
movies by "prior restraint under proper criteria." Confronted with
the same statute as in the instant case, the court further concluded
that the specified standards established by the statute could be
applied without much difficulty since they had acquired a definite
and precise meaning over the years. On the basis of this statutory
norm, the court upheld the decision of the censors.
The Supreme Court of the United States did not accept the
reasoning of the Commercial Pictures Corp. case, supra, nor the
Superior Films case, supra. The Court reviewed both these cases
together and, in a memorandum decision, were reversed on the
authority of the Burstyn case, supra. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587 (1954). The New
York Court of Appeals thereafter, on motion, directed the Board
of Regents to issue a license to allow the showing of the same
movie it had previously banned. Commercial Pictures Corp. v.
Board of Regents, 306 N.Y. 850, 118 N.E.2d 908 (1954).
Thus the Supreme Court has extended the decision of the
Burstyn case to strike down standards of "best interests," "immoral," "tend to corrupt morals," and "harmful." As yet the
Court has not been presented with a clearly drafted statute designed to prohibit the public exhibition of obscene films, which,
as it indicated in the Burstyn case, might require a different
answer.
However, there is a possibility that this question might come
before the Court as the result of current litigation in Illinois. An
ordinance of the City of Chicago authorizes the police commissioner to refuse a license to exhibit any motion picture which
he finds to be "immoral or obscene." Applying these norms, the
commissioner refused to permit the exhibition of "The Miracle"
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in Chicago. The trial court enjoined the prevention of exhibition,
but the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and held that the
city did have the power to censor movies on the basis of these
standards. The case was remanded to the trial court for the
determination of whether or not the film in question was in
fact obscene. American Civil Liberties Union v The City of
Chicago, 3 IlM. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954). Should the trial
court sustain the finding of the censor that the film is "obscene,"
it is the.opinion of this writer that the Supreme Court of the
United States may be called upon to answer the question which
it anticipated in the Burstyn case.
Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in
Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, supra, and disregarding the inferential effect of the United States Supreme
Court's reversal of that case, a lower court in Ohio refused
to enjoin the enforcement of the same censorship act which had
been under attack in these prior cases. R.K.O. Pictures v. Hissong,
123 N.E.2d 441 (Ohio C.P. 1954). The court, disregarding the fact
that this statute had been impliedly declared invalid by the Supreme Court in the Superior Films case, supra, interpreted it as
prohibiting the showing of obscene films. The United States Supreme Court had apparently recognized that obscenity might be
censored in the Burstyn case; and on this basis, the court upheld
the validity of the statute.
The principal case was a direct proceeding in the Supreme
Court of Ohio from the Department of Education, and, although
no mention is made of R.K.O. Pictures v. Hissong, supra, any
weight which this latter case might have had in subsequent
cases has been completely destroyed by the decision in the
instant case. Moreover, the present case indicates that the Supreme Court of Ohio has finally come to realize that the censorship statute of Ohio is not sufficiently clear and definite to be
upheld as a constitutionally valid prior restraint on the public
exhibition of motion picture films. The failure to strike down
the statute once and for all is explained in the court rule that
requires six judges to concur in such action.
George N. Tompkins, Jr.

FRANew
York, 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S.
867 (1954). On October 8, 1953, the board of trustees of the
State University of New York adopted a resolution outlawing all
social organizations that had any affiliation outside the university.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL RIGHTS - PROHIBITION Or
TERNITIES AND SORORITIES. - Webb v. State University of
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The president of the university was authorized to determine
what organizations fell within this prohibition and to take steps
to exclude them. The plaintiffs and intervenors are members of
national fraternities and sororities, and this action is brought
under 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952), to have the
resolution declared unconstitutional and void as depriving them
of their civil rights. This three man federal court had been
granted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1952), since
injunctive relief was prayed against a state body. Webb v. State
University of New York, 120 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
The question this court was called on to decide was whether
or not a state board of education has the power to prohibit the
existence in state institutions of fraternities and sororities connected with national chapters. The district court held the board
did have this power by virtue of its interest in a sound educational system under N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 355, which gave the trustees,
when approved by the board of regents, general supervisory
power to regulate the admission of students, and to prescribe the
qualifications for their continued attendance.
The concept of liberty by its very nature is incapable of being
defined exactly. Attempts to define so nebulous a term have,
as in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), been expressed with reference to the privileges essential to "the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." The Court there went on to
say, 262 U.S. at 399-400:
The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State to effect. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of
police power is nct final or conclusive but is subject to supervision
by the courts.

The Meyer case, supra, involved the validity of a state law forbidding the teaching of German to grade school pupils which
was held invalid since there was no reasonable cause for such
a law. The requirement of a proper and necessary reason for
control was reaffirmed in 1954 in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. at
499-500, where the Court stated: "Liberty under law extends to
the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue,
and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective." (Emphasis added) Again a "proper objective" of the
exercise of a state's police power became the standard, the application of which was the issue presented to the district court in
the instant case.
Two types of cases involving interdictions against fraternities
and sororities have been presented to the courts. The first type
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are those which challenge the constitutionality of a state statute
outlawing fraternities and sororities, and the second arise out
of attempts by boards of education to do the same thing.
In Waugh v. Bd. of Trustees of the University of Mississippi,
237 U.S. 589 (1915), the enforcement of a statute of Mississippi,
requiring the signing of a pledge that an applicant for admission
to a state school was never a member of a prohibited fraternity
and that he would not join, was sought to be restrained by the
plaintiff, who was denied admission to the state law. school because of his membership in a prohibited fraternity. He alleged
the statute was an obstruction to his pursuit of happiness and a
deprivation of his property rights, as well as of his privileges
and immunities under the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court met these arguments by taking the view that the
right to attend a university was a conditional, not an absolute
right and that the educational institutions of the State of Mississippi were under the control of the state legislature. The grounds
of this control was that these institutions were maintained by
public funds and any disciplinary enactment for the furtherance
of educational purposes could not be curtailed. The reasoning
in the Waugh case, supra, was applied in Satan Fraternityv. Bd.
of Public Educ., 156 Fla. 222, 22 So. 2d 892 (1945), where the
constitutionality of a Florida statute banning faternities and
secret organizations in primary and secondary schools was upheld
as a valid disciplinary measure by the state. The Florida court
grounded its decision, 22 So. 2d at 893:
* . . on the theory that the right to attend an educational institution provided by the State is not a natural right but a public
benefaction and those who seek to become beneficiaries of them
must submit to such regulations and conditions as the law imposes
as a prerequisite to participate.

Accord, Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 57 F. Supp. 508
(W.D. La. 1944), af'd per curiam, 323 U.S. 685 (1945); Burkitt
v. School Dist. No. 1, 195 Ore. 471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952).
Statutes prohibiting fraternities and sororities in primary and
secondary schools are common today. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 1607516077 (1952); ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 122.31-1 - 122.31-5 (1946); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15.741-15.744 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:14-110,

18:14-111 (1940). In addition to a question of violation of the
fourteenth amendment, these statutes have been attacked on a
second ground, i.e., that they amount to class legislation. However, this objection is answered by the fact that the statute
applies to all students, Bradford v. Bd. of Educ., 18 Cal. App.
19, 121 Pac. 929 (1912); that it keeps youth from wasting its
assets and is necessary to keep interest and the school curriculum
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at its highest efficiency, Lee v. Hoffman, 182 Iowa 1216, 166 N.W.
565, 568 (1918); and that it is necessary for training and discipline, Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, supra; Hughes v. Caddo
Parish School Bd., supra.
The problem of the extent to which legislation in prohibition
of high school fraternities might go was brought out in the dissenting opinion in Steele v. Sexton, 253 Mich. 32, 234 N.W. 436,
438-440 (1931), in which reductio ad absurdum argument was
used, wherein the judge stated that if this outlawing type of
legislation continued to be upheld, the state could exceed its
legitimate sphere and prevent student membership in the Knights
of Columbus, Masons, Elks, etc. and withhold the earned academic
credits of Methodists, Presbyterians, or Catholics. But in actual
practice the line of control has been drawn at fraternities and
sororities. Satan Fraternity v. Bd. of Public Educ., supra. Thus,
there is unanimity of judicial opinion that legislation prohibiting
the existence of fraternities and sororities is a reasonable exercise of the disciplinary power of the states over the educational
institutions which they create and maintain.
Some states have even permitted boards of education to outlaw fraternities and sororities under general education laws such
as N.c. GEN. STAT. § 115-19 (1952), which reads: "The State Board
of Education shall ... generally ... supervise and administer
the free public school system of the State and make all needful
rules and regulations in relation thereto." See N.Y. EDuc. LAW
§ 355. Nor has the constitutionality of such procedure been questioned. Smith v. Bd. of Educ., 182 IM. App. 342 (1913) (Illinois
at this time did not have an express prohibition of such societies
as is presently embodied in ILL. ANN. STAT., supra). Generally
these rules and regulations merely prohibit a student who will
not renounce his affiliation from participating in any type of
school activity or from receiving honors. Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist., 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App. 1945); Wayland
v. Bd. of School Directors,43 Wash. 441, 86 Pac. 642 (1906).
The grounds on which these rules are attacked are that the
schools do not have power to regulate student activities outside
of school hours and that they interfere with the right of parental
discipline. This rationale was accepted in both State ex rel.
Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278 (1882) and Wright v. Bd. of Educ.,
295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922), which are the only cases so
holding. Coincidentally each of these cases has a dissent extolling
the majority view. In the White case, supra, Purdue University
was ordered to admit anyone physically and mentally healthy
provided there was room available, since it was a public institution and, therefore, could not bar an applicant who would not
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sign a pledge. The court made a distinction between the requirements fdr admission and for control and management, possibly
leaving room for a rule that a pledge might be demanded when
the student was already actually in attendance. In the Wright
case, supra, the Missouri court went much further and expressly
ruled that control by a teacher or board of education ceases
when the child reaches his home, unless the child's act there will
affect the conduct of other school children. Fraternity membership was held not bad in itself, and therefore a rule prohibiting
membership was invalid, since the general education statute of
Missouri did not give express power to the board of education
to outlaw such membership.
However, in Wilson v. Bd. of Educ., 233 Ill. 464, 84 N.E. 697
(1908), under a general constitutional provision for a school
system and in Wayland v. Bd. of School Directors, supra, under
a general statute, the courts upheld school board prohibition of
fraternities and sororities. These cases and others representing
a strong majority base their decisions on the premise that the
boards were created to operate schools and that they, not courts
or juries, know the conditions of school life intimately. Therefore, with this knowledge the school boards themselves are able
to determine what is necessary for the schools to function at
peak efficiency, and rules to achieve this purpose are valid. Wilson v. Board of Educ., supra, 84 N.E. at 700; accord, Coggins v.
Bd of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E.2d 527 (1944); Wilson v. Abilene
Independent School Dist., supra. Nor are parents' rights infringed
upon, for the control of the school extends to anything which
might possibly interfere with study habits, the character of the
pupil, or the reputation of the school. Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass.
103, 191 N.E. 407 (1934). Also it is said in Waugh b Bd. of Trustees of the University of Mississippi, supra, regarding the Mississippi statute, whoever passed the regulation must have been of
the opinion that fraternity membership was detrimental, and,
since it was, it should be outlawed. Furthermore, the courts will
not interfere with such prohibition of fraternities and sororities
if made as a reasonable disciplinary measure which is within the
exclusive discretion of thd boards. Ingrig v. Srygley, 210 Ark.
580, 197 S.W.2d 39 (1946); Coggins v. Bd. of Educ., supra.
"The right to attend school exists, but it does not exist absolutely, but is a right that is subject at all times to reasonable
conditions the state may impose." Johnson v. Town of Deerfleld,
25 F. Supp. 918, 921 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 306 U.S. 621
(1939). This limitation on education is not a restraint on a student's liberty for it is absolutely necessary, to guide his untrained
mind, that such power be had by those possessing experience.
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Thus, a limitation on a fraternity or sorority by statute is valid,
and if a regulation promulgated by a board of education is in
its function to operate the schools efficiently, it, too, is also valid
according to the clear weight of authority. In the instant case
the court conclusively held, in complete accord with the logical
view, that boards of education are free to make such rules for
the attainment of their purpose - to create and maintain a productive educational system.
James M. Corcoran, Jr.
CoNsTITuTIoNAL

LAw -

INTERSTATE COmIERcE

-

CoNFLICT

OF STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN RE MOTOR CARRIERS. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 75 Sup. Ct. 191 (1954).
The respondent, Hayes Freight Lines, was engaged in transporting goods in the State of Illinois both local and interstate
commerce. It had certificates from both the Interstate Commerce
Commission under the power granted by the Federal Motor Carriers Act, 54 STAT. 919 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1952) and the
State of Illinois. An Illinois statute provides that fines shall be
imposed for violation of weight limits there set out, and further
provides for the suspension of a carrier's right to use the highway
for repeated violations. IL.. REV. STAT. § 229 (b) (1953). The motor
carrier brought action for declaratory judgment as to the validity
of certain sections of the Illinois statute. The Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the suspension of intrastate operations was valid,
but that no part of the interstate operations could be suspended.
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court agreed with the
view of the Illinois court, while conceding the right of the state
to punish for weight violations, it held that the power to suspend
all operatioiis by the carrier is within the exclusive domain of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), one of the
earliest cases of conflict between the power of a sovereign state
over transportation and the federal power under the commerce
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Gibbon's federally granted license, to
engage in interstate commerce by boat, was in direct conflict with
the exclusive right to use New York waterways that had been
given to one Livingston and subsequently assigned to Ogden.
The issue of whether a state can regulate commerce among the
states while Congress is regulating it is present in the instant
case as it was in the Gibbons case, supra. The court stated that
the power to nullify inconsistent state control arises from the
declaration that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The law of the state must yield to the
act of Congress.
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Five years later, state obstruction of interstate commerce by
a dam over a navigable stream was held not repugnant to
Congress' ower to regulate commerce as no legislation had been
enacted in that area. Wilson v. Black Bird Creek MarshCo., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 245 (1819). But even when Congress has legislated, if such
legislation manifests an intent not to cover the entire field, the
state is not deprived of power to legislate in the remaining area.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
In the course of striking down a Missouri licensing statute that
discriminated against the sale of out of state goods and burdened
interstate commerce the Court stated: "There is a difficulty, it
is true, in all cases of this character, in drawing the line precisely
where the commercial power of Congress ends .and the power
of the state begins." Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 281 (1876).
In the instant case the line must be drawn between a state's right
to protect its roads by acceptable legislation and the extent to
which that legislation burdens interstate commerce. Sproles v.
Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915) was a forerunner
of many similar cases in which the state and federal government
clashed over the control of highway traffic passing through the
state. Maryland required all persons using its highways to obtain
a certificate of registration, including those just passing through
the state; the certificate being in the nature of state permission
to use the road. The court pointed out the necessity for good
maintenance of the roads and held the tax was not an unlawful
burden on interstate commerce but a legitimate exercise of police
powers. A frequently cited case dealing with state transport
certificates is Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) where
such certificate was refused to one Buck who wished to operate
a common carrier in interstate commerce but could not because
he was unable to obtain the state license. The Court, in striking
down the law of Washington, stated that the primary purpose
of the state law was not to encourage safety and preservation of
highways, but to limit competition and hence its effect was to
obstruct interstate commerce. Similarly, in the same year, the
Court declared a Michigan law invalid that required all motor
vehicles for hire to be registered as common carriers and as
such take out certain indemnity bonds. The appellant was a
private carrier and as a result of this law was forced to become
a common carrier. The fault in this law was that it subjected
the right to use the highway to unnecessary restrictions. Michigan
Public Utilities Comm'rs v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925).
A motor vehicle act in Texas prohibited operation on the state
highway of vehicles over the stipulated weight. TEx. PEN. CODE
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AN. art. 827a (1931). The limitation on weight was held not per
se repugnant to the commerce clause and there was no congressional action, hence the limitation was upheld. It was stated
that the state is not powerless to protect its highways from being
subjected to excessive burdens. Sproles v. Binford, supra. A more
comprehensive prohibition was upheld in Bradley v. Public
Utilities Commission, 289 U.S. 92 (1933), where the State of Ohio
refused a certificate to use a highway because it was already too
congested and the carrier refused to take another route. Once
again, by reason of the right of the state to regulate traffic to
promote safety, the enactment was upheld. The effect on interstate commerce was said to be merely incidental, even though the
prohibited vehicles were used exclusively in interstate commerce.
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) and South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177 (1938), both of
which were decided after the passage of the Federal Motor Carriers Act, supra, are two of the frequently cited cases on the
point in issue. In the Maurer case, supra, Pennsylvania prohibited the use of highways by vehicles carrying other vehicles
over the head of the operator of such carrier vehicles. In holding
that this limitation was not in conflict with the commerce clause,
the Court explained that the regulation was to insure the safe
and convenient use of the highways. This was accomplished
through control of the size and weight of motor vehicles, a right
reserved to the states by federal law. 54 STAT. 929 (1935), 49
U.S.C. §325 (1952). The Court must pass on the question of whether
such state restrictions are reasonable means to protect the roads
in the light of possible effect on interstate commerce, South
Carolinav. Barnwell, supra. If these restrictions are found to be
necessary to preserve state roads such limitations will apply
with equal force to both interstate commerce and intrastate
commerce. Both of the above cases were deemed controlling in
Whitney v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Ky. 1941), afld, 314
U.S. 574 (1941). Here the court, in uph]olding a Kentucky limitation of weight to 18,000 lbs. per truck said, in effect, that to permit
tonnage to pass over roads unable to bear the weight would result
in the complete breakdown and disruption of highway systems.
37 F. Supp. at page 68.
Licensing and taxing go hand in hand and the power of a
state to tax commercial motor vehicles, particularly trucks, has
been challenged many times. Especially applicable to this discussion are the cases where the tax is based on the weight of the
trucks. In Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927), an Ohio statute
required payment of a graduated tax according to the number
and capacity of vehicles used on the roads. As the tax did not
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discriminate, nor obstruct interstate commerce and was used
to maintain the roads involved, it was held valid. Thus common
carriers who use the highways as a place of business may be
expected to be assessed for their upkeep. In Hicklin v. Coney,
290 U.S. 169 (1933), the Court again upheld a "carrying capacity"
tax in South Carolina, since it was reasonable and was applied
to keeping the roads in repair; while being neither discriminatory, nor burdening interstate commerce. Capacity taxes were
also upheld in Idaho, Consolidated Freight Lines v. Pfost, 7 F.
Supp. 629 (S.D. Idaho 1934), and Indiana, Eavey v. Treasury
Department, 216 Ind. 255, 24 N.E.2d 268, appeal dismissed, 310
U.S. 611 (1939).
More recently taxes were upheld where a trucker was arrested for carrying liquor through a state without paying the
license tax, Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941); and
where the tax was primarily on city trucks, but they also carried
interstate commerce, City of Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S.
547 (1953); and where the plaintiff failed to show that a weight
tax deprived him of rights under the commerce clause. Bode v.
Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953).
It is apparent from the above cases that the control of Congress
over interstate commerce through the Federal Motor Carriers
Act, supra, does not completely restrain the state's power to
promote the welfare of the state by highway safety and conservation methods. See, George, Alleged Conflict between The Federal
Motor Carriers Act and other Statutes, 22 RocKY MT. L. REV.
13 (1949). Congress has also authorized the Commission to
investigate and report as to the size and weight of vehicles,
impliedly leaving regulation in the hands of the states. See,
Swerer, State Regulation of Interstate Transportationby Motor
Carriers,16 RocKY MT. L. REV. 53 (1943).
If a state's system of enforcement of its weight regulations by
fines is ineffective the state can work through the machinery of
the Commission to have the violators banned from the highways.
Every motor vehicle must obey the laws of the state in which it
operates unless it is at variance with a Commission order. 49
CODE FED. REGS. § 192.3 (Cum. Supp. 1954). Therefore, the Commission can protect the state's interest, after an investigation
of the facts, by ordering compliance with state law and, if there
is wilful failure to comply, revoke the federal certificate. 49
STAT. 555, 49 U.S.C. § 312 (1952).
An analysis of the above cases illustrates that the federal
government has left some regulation of carriers to the states.
However, when the federal government has specifically acted, as
in the instant case where it granted the Hayes Freight Co. a
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certificate of convenience and necessity through the Interstate
Commerce Commission any state law that attempts to revoke the
federally protected right or privilege is void.
John L. Rosshirt

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INTERSTATE COMMERCE PROFESSIONAL BOXING UNDER THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRuST ACT.-United

States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 75
Sup. Ct. 259 (1955). This is a civil anti-trust action brought
by the government against the defendants, three corporations and two individuals, who are engaged in the- business
of promoting professional championship boxing contests. The
government charged that the defendants, in the course of their
business, have violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209
(1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952). The government's complaint
alleged that the defendants made a substantial utilization of the
channels of interstate trade and commerce and had restrained
and monopolized this trade and commerce in the "promotion,
exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting and motion picture production and distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the United States," through a conspiracy to exclude
competition. The district court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint. (The district court's opinion was oral and
not transcribed.) The case came to the Supreme Court on direct
appeal under the Expediting Act, 62 STAT. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1952).
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether or
not the defendant's business, of promoting professional championship boxing contests on a multistate basis, coupled with the sale
of rights to televise, broadcast, and film the contests for interstate transmission constituted "trade" and "commerce" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act, thus making the defendants liable
for violations thereof.
Assuming the facts to be true, it was held that the fact that a
boxing match was a local affair did not bar application of the
Sherman Act to a business based on the promotion of such
matches if the business is itself engaged in interstate commerce
or if the business imposes illegal restraints on interstate commerce. The Court was of the opinion that it would be sufficient
to rest the allegation that boxing activities are interstate commerce upon the ground that over 25% of the revenue from championship boxing is derived from interstate operations through
the sale of radio, television, and motion picture rights. The Court
deemed it necessary first to distinguish the holdings in Federal
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Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), and Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), to the effect that professional
baseball was not subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act since the
defendants in the instant case contended that these cases
immunized any business involving exhibitions of an athletic
nature.
The Supreme Court adhered to the Federal Baseball ruling in
deciding the Toolson case, supra, only insofar as that decision
determined that Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the anti-trust laws, 346 U.S.
356, 357. The Toolson case, supra, neither overruled the Federal
Baseball case, supra, nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said
in that case. Thus, the Toolson case did not extend anti-trust
exemptions to all business based on local exhibitions. The intention of the Toolson case is clear -

to exempt baseball -and

no

other sport.
The defendants relied on the opinion in FederalBaseball,supra,
in which the Court said, 259 U.S. at 209:
... Personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of
commerce. That which in its consummation is not commerce does
not become commerce among the States because that transportation
(across state lines) that we have mentioned takes place.

In the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 19 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
448 (1823), the Court said that: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It described
the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations,
in all its branches. . . " Thus commerce is interstate when it
involves more than one State. In International Textbook Co. v.
Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910), the Court held commerce to include
the mere transmission of information or intelligence. Commercial
intercourse is an element of commerce and the mere transmission
of the intangible, e.g., ideas and intelligence, is interstate commerce when carried on between the states. The telegraph, as a
carrier of messages, is an instrumentality of commerce since its
business is commerce itself. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 356 (1887); Pensacola Telegraph Co. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 9 (1877). The gathering
of news by a press association and its transmission to member
newspapers is termed interstate commerce, Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The business of insurance in
different States is interstate commerce, United States v. SouthEastern UnderwritersAss'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
Congress can interfere with the completely internal concerns
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of a State for the purpose of executing its general powers, one
of which is its power over foreign and interstate commerce. It
is generally agreed that "no form of State activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce
clause to Congress." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,
315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942). Thus the power to regulate commerce
is the power to restrain or prohibit it at all times for the welfare
of the public, provided only that the specific limitation imposed
upon Congress' power, or by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, are observed; United States v. Caroline Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938). Thus, in Houston E. & W.T. Ry. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), it was held that Congress
could take all necessary measures appropriate to the end of
fostering and protecting interstate commerce, even though intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may, as a result, be controlled.
Since the decision in the Federal Baseball case, supra, it has
become apparent that when "personal effort" is connected with
something else, such as restricting the competing telecasts of
league games in a team's area when that team is playing an
"away game," there may very well be an unreasonable and illegal
restraint of trade which comes within the provisions of the Sherman Act. United States v. National FootballLeague, 116 F. Supp.
319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). In the latter case, the defendants contended
that the action against them should have been dismissed because
professional football is not commerce or interstate commerce.
This contention was rejected and it was held that the restrictions
by professional football on the sale of radio and television rights
imposed substantial restraints on the television and radio industry. Since the effect of the League by-laws was to restrict substantially that which was interstate commerce, it was immaterial
whether professional football standing by itself, was commerce or interstate commerce. Radio, television, and motion
picture activities are clearly interstate commerce. Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (radio); United States
v. ParamountPictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (motion pictures);
DuMont LaboratoriesInc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 154 (3d Cir.
1950), cert.denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951) (television).
However, as the Court has pointed out, not all restraints are
illegal, only unreasonable restraints are prohibited. By the terms
of the Sherman Act, every contract in restraint of trade is unlawful. But long ago, a vague "rule of reason" supplanted the
strict letter of the statute. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 66 (1916). Since every regulation of trade tends to
restrain, the true test of legality is whether or not the restraint
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promotes or destroys competition. The approach of the Supreme
Court to the problem is well expressed in Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), where the Court said,
246 U.S. at 238:
...the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
...
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint . . . the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), it was
held that the Sherman Act does not condemn all combinations
which interrupt interstate commerce, but only those which divide
marketing territories, apportion customers, and basically injure
the consumer. The Act's main purpose is to preserve normal
competition in the market and to center the restraint of trade
limitations on only those agreements affecting prices for an unlawful purpose by unlawful means. In United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 644 (1940), it was stated that the purpose of the Act was
to prohibit those restraints which would prevent the public from
freely receiving goods and services. To be illegal, the restraint
must also be unreasonable, which depends, not upon a scientific
formula applicable to all cases, but upon a consideration of the
intent of the parties and the effect on the public. At the very
foundation lies a consideration of the nature and condition of
the business to -be effected. Westway Theater, Inc. v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 30 F. Supp. 830 (D. Md. 1940), aff'd,
113 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1940).
The only real distinction between the baseball and boxing
cases indicated by the Court in the instant case is that when the
government's complaint against boxing was filed, "no court had
ever held that the boxing business is not subject to the anti-trust
laws," 75 Sup. Ct. at 262. The Toolson case, supra, 346 U.S. at 357,
points out that the business of baseball had "been left for thirty
years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject
to existing anti-trust legislation." Thus the. Court said that if
an exemption under the Sherman Act should be denied baseball,
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or granted to boxing, then it is an issue for Congress alone to
determine. It is clear, from the interpretation given to it by
the Court in the instant case and the Toolson case, that the
Federal Baseball case did not hold that all business based on
professional sports is outside the scope of the anti-trust laws.
The case of United States v. Shubert, 75 Sup. Ct. 277 (1955),
decided the same day as the instant case, held that the business
of producing, booking, and presenting legitimate stage attractions
on a multistate basis constitutes "trade or commerce" that is
"among the several states" within the meaning of those terms
in the Sherman Act. In this case involving the legitimate theater,
the Court was on somewhat firmer ground by reason of the decision in Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923),
that the theatrical business could fall within the scope of the
federal anti-trust laws, since part of the defendants' business was
making contracts that call on performers to travel between the
states and abroad and, in the connection therewith, require the
transportation of large quantities of scenery, costumes, etc., which
resulted in a constant stream of commerce from state to state.
"Trade or commerce" has been held to include the production,
distribution, and exhibition of motion pictures, United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), and a liberal construction has been given the requirement of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act that the "trade or commerce" be "among the several States." In the motion picture cases, the requirement was
satisfied by the interstate transportation of films, Binderup v.
Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923), even though the actual
"showing of motion pictures is of course a local affair," United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 183 (1944).
Moreover, once interstate commerce is established, it has been
held that the Sherman Act may be applied even to "local" restraints on that commerce. United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); accord, United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949); Mandeville Island
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
Thus we have seen that only baseball is exempt from the
Sherman Act. Other activities, such as professional football,
boxing, legitimate theatre, radio, television, and motion pictures
are all subject to the Sherman Act when they involve transportation across state lines. Obviously, the argument of Mr. Justice
Holmes in the FederalBaseball case, supra, that "Personal effort,
not related to production, is not a subject of commerce," is no
longer valid, or, at best, has been limited by subsequent decisions
of the Supreme Court.
What possible effect could these decisions have upon collegiate
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athletics? Many college athletic activities are comparable to
organized professional football and baseball in that teams cross
state lines, carry paraphernalia with them, and charge admissions,
with resulting profit for the sponsoring universities. Furthermore, the games are broadcast and televised through interstate
media. Who can anticipate the ramifications of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association's policy of restricted television
and of only allowing the "game of the week" to be televised?
It was a restriction similar to this that was struck down in the
National Football League case, supra. Concededly, radio, television, and motion pictures are within "interstate commerce" as
applied in the Sherman Act. Could the NCAA policy on restricted television be brought within §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act? Under the present decisions of the Supreme Court, it would
seem that such a policy comes dangerously close to being a "restraint of trade among the several states."
Ronald P. Mealey
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-WAvER IN FELONY

ACTION NOT OPERATING AS WAIVER IN SUBSEQUENT HABITUAL CRim-

Chandler v. Fretag, 75 Sup. Ct. 1 (1954). Petitioner Chandler seeks his release from prison by writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that he was denied counsel at his trial
on a habitual criminal charge following his conviction for housebreaking and larceny. Intending to plead guilty to the latter
offense only, he advised the court that he did not need a lawyer.
At the trial he was told, for the first time, that he would also
be tried as a habitual criminal under the Tennessee Habitual
Criminal Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 11863.1 (Williams Supp. 1951),
which imposes a mandatory life sentence with no possibility of
parole. Petitioner's immediate request for a continuance to enable him to retain counsel was denied. He pleaded guilty to the
housebreaking and larceny charge, and the ury accepted his
plea, sentencing him to three years imprisonment. The jury then
found Chandler to be a habitual criminal, this being his fourth
offense. The entire proceeding from the impaneling of the jury
to the passing of sentence, required less than ten minutes time.
Three years later, after having completed his sentence on the
minor charge, Chandler petitioned the circuit court for a writ
of habeas corpus, seeking relief from the life imprisonment under
the habitual criminal conviction. The Tennessee Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court's denial of the writ, ruling that petitioner had waived his right to counsel on the habitual criminal
charge by waiving counsel on the prior charge. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the action of the trial court amounted
INAL CHARGE. -
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to a deprivation of petitioner's right to counsel under the due
process provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.
The issue for the determination of the Court was whether
failure to allow Chandler to retain counsel after he had previously declined legal assistance on the minor charge violated due
process.
Due process requirements with regard to the right to counsel
originated not with the English courts but with the practices in
the American colonies at the time of the drafting of the Constitution. In England, an accused's right to counsel in a felony
case was not recognized until 1836 by statute, 6 & 7 WILL. 4, c.
114. 1 CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 700 (8th ed. 1927).
This English rule was rejected by the colonies in America, which
afforded the right to counsel in nearly all criminal prosecutions.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
Conflict over the right to counsel in criminal cases has caused
considerable litigation in the past two decades. That every defendant has the right, if he so desires, to have an attorney appear
in his behalf in court is unquestioned. Powell v. Alabama, supra,
at 71; BEAEy, RIGHT TO COUNSEL ix AimmcAI COURTS 89 (1955).
Powell v. Alabama, supra, specifically determined that in all
capital cases, the defendant is entitled to counsel. However, in
noncapital cases no such unequivocal rule has been defined to
guide the trial court. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Of
course, in all federal criminal cases, capital or noncapital, an
accused must have assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, unless he understandingly waives that
right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Betts v. Brady,
supra, flatly rejected the incorporation of the sixth amendment
in the fourteenth. The court held that in deciding whether due
process was denied the accused, the totality of facts in a given
case must be appraised. If a "fair trial" resulted despite the
absence of counsel, it can not be said that the rights of the
defendant have been infringed.
It is interesting to study the application of this "fair trial"
doctrine in the cases involving alleged denials of due process.
In the instant case and several others to be discussed below, the
Supreme Court has had to decide whether such unusual circumstances existed as to make inadequate any defense without benefit of counsel.
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) is a relatively recent
decision concerning the abuse of the right to counsel in a noncapital case. The petitioner there appeared without benefit of
counsel, and after being told by the arraigning magistrate that
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he would be indicted for breaking and entering, he pleaded guilty.
Not until he arrived at the state penitentiary was he informed
of his conviction of the more serious offense of robbery. The
Supreme Court, considering these facts as well as evidence that
the accused had spent the greater part of his life in reform
schools, concluded that he exhibited no qualities of mind or character that would enable him to protect himself in the give-andtake of a courtroom trial. In other words, special circumstances
may demand that counsel be afforded even in a noncapital case.
The obvious inability of the accused to defend himself was
again the court's reason for reversing a conviction of an eighteen
year old boy in Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948). Defendant
asked the court to furnish him a lawyer, but the Florida court
refused, relying upon the broad rule of Betts v. Brady, supra.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, said, 334 U.S.,
at 684:
There are some individuals who, because of age, ignorance, or
mental capacity, are incapable of representing themselves adequately
in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature.... Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint counsel is a denial of due
process of law....

Betts v. Brady, supra, was strictly applied in Canizio v. New
York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946). The defendant, being without counsel
and not having been advised of his rights at the arraignment,
pleaded guilty to the charge of robbery. On the day before and
the day of sentencing, however, he was represented by an attorney. The Court upheld his conviction and sentence, on the
grounds that the record showed that he had the aid of counsel
in ample time to use every defense originally available to him.
To little avail the dissenting justices urged that an accused is
entitled to counsel at every step in the proceedings and even
assuming that the attorney had struck out the prior plea of guilty,
it would have been too difficult to overcome the incriminating
effect of the plea. In Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), where
denial of counsel was held not a violation of due process under
the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court explained that
it was not its province to establish a minimum procedural standard for state courts with regard to defendants' right to counsel,
in view of the historic power of the states to maintain their own
local court procedure. The Court's function is to insure that
whatever procedure the state establishes does not violate due
process.
An opposite decision was reached in Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437, 442 (1948), in which the Court decided that the
petitioner being "young and inexperienced in the intricacies of
criminal procedure" required the presence of counsel. The de-
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fendant, seventeen years old, had pleaded guilty to four offenses
of burglary, requiring a twenty to forty year sentence. In addition, there was no attempt by the court to instruct the boy as
to the consequences of his plea. On similar facts in a one-day
murder proceeding in Michigan, where capital punishment does
not exist, the conviction was struck down. DeMeerler v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947).
Understandably, the lower federal courts also have experienced
difficulty in determining when denial of counsel violates due
process. In Hanson v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,198 F.2d
470 (4th Cir. 1952), petitioner maintained that his confession
was improperly obtained, but he nevertheless pleaded guilty at
the trial, without benefit of counsel. A motion for writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that petitioner had been deprived of a
fair trial was denied, the court holding that failure to provide
counsel where the offense is not punishable by death is not of
itself a denial of due process. However, in Anderson v. Eidson,
191 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1951), the court reversed a conviction obtained when defendant pleaded guilty to four crimes, one being
a capital offense, without assistance of counsel. The court determined that after pleading guilty to the capital offense, the defendant had "put his life at the mercy of the court" with respect to
the other felonies, and thus should have had the advice of a
lawyer from the outset.
The Supreme Court in the instant case distinguished the facts
'from those of Betts v. Brady on the grounds that Chandler was
not asking for the appointment of counsel, but wanted a continuance to retain his own counsel. The lower court held that Chandler had waived his right to counsel by not hiring one to represent him on the housebreaking charge.
The general test regarding the validity of a waiver of counsel
is expressed in Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at 464:
The determination [in habeas corpus proceedings] of whether

there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.

Following this general guide, the Supreme Court in the instant
case decided that Chandler, in refusing counsel on the felony
charge, while not being aware of the possibility of being charged
as a habitual criminal, did not intend his waiver to extend to
that part of the indictment. Not being fully appraised of the
facts he was not capable of a competent and intelligent waiver.
A dictum in Sanders v. United.States, 205 F.2d 399 (5th Cir.
1953), which involved a plea of guilty by an alleged insane per-
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son, indicates that in order for one to competently waive the
right to counsel he must know the nature of the charge, all the
statutory offenses included under it, and the range of allowable
punishments.
It has been held that where an accused is not told of the term
of the sentence which would probably have to be served, until
after a plea of guilty to murder, his refusal of an attorney is not
a competent waiver. Voigt v. Webb, 47 F. Supp. 743 (D.C. Cir.
1942). A similar denial of clue process occurred in Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941), where the defendant agreed with
the prosecuting attorney to plead guilty to simple burglary for
which he would be sentenced to a three year term. However,
after pleading guilty at the arraignment, he was told that the
indictment charged him with committing burglary with explosives, and he was sentenced to twenty years. He immediately
demanded an opportunity to hire an attorney, but the court
rejected his plea on the ground that he had already waived his
right. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed, saying this was
a clear deprivation of due process.
Thus, an effective waiver of the right to appear and be assisted
by an attorney in a criminal case necessarily includes a sufficient
understanding of the nature of the crime and the possible punishment. Where no effective waiver of counsel was made, and the
circumstances indicate that the accused was denied a fair trial
as in the instant case, due process is violated and the conviction
will not stand. The Supreme Court has not yet defined exactly
what the "special circumstances" are which require presence of
counsel in a noncapital case, and it definitely has not repudiated
the test established by Betts v. Brady, supra. However, the decisions clearly show a tendency to discover these extenuating
circumstances more frequently, especially in the recent cases.
Patrick J. Foley
DOMEsTIc RELATIONS - ADOPTION - WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO
CHILD's RELIGION IN PLACEMENT IN FOSTER HOME.- Petition of

Goldman....
Mass ..... , 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied,
75 Sup. Ct. 363 (1955). The petitioners, husband and wife, who
are of the Jewish faith, sought to adopt twin children, parents
of whom are members of the Roman Catholic church. A Massachusetts statute provides in part that the judge, when practicable, must give custody only to persons of the same faith as
that of the child. In those instances where the court, with due

regard for the religion of the child, does permit adoption by
persons of a different faith, the statute requires that the minutes
of the proceedings state the impelling facts for granting the
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petition. mAss. ANN. LAWS c. 210, § 5B (Cum. Supp. 1953). Two
weeks after birth, the children were transferred from the hospital to the home of the petitioners and the testimony regarding
the manner of the transfer was said to be conflicting and unreliable. The natural mother consented both orally and in writing
to the twins being raised in the Jewish faith. When the Jewish
couple filed for legal adoption papers, the probate court denied
the petition on the basis of the Massachusetts statute. The
probate court had found that it was "practicable" to give custody
to persons of the Catholic faith since there were Catholic parents
available in the area, and further that it was in the best interests
of the twins that they be adopted by members of the faith of
their birth. The supreme judicial court affirmed over the objection that it would be prejudicial to the children's interests to
remove them from their present foster home.
The question to be discussed is what should be the controlling
consideration when the courts are faced with the apparent conflict between the material well-being and the spiritual welfare
of the child. Must the courts ignore the religious origin of a
child when it has found worldly security in a family of a different religion? The court in the instant case determined that the
statute attested to an already well-settled principle that children
should generally be adopted within the faith of their natural
parents.
Adoption, while practiced by the ancients of Greece and Rome,
was unknown to the English common law and exists in the
United States only by virtue of statutes enacted in many, if not
all of our states. Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 CoLum. L.
REV. 332 (1922). The courts in our country hold that adoption
statutes should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficial
purposes of adoption. Bradley v. Tweedy, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N.W.
973, 974 (1925).
Prior to the determination of the instant case, the controlling
view in Massachusetts was exemplified in In re Gally, 107 N.E.2d
21 (Mass. 1952) where the supreme court permitted a Catholic
child to be adopted by Protestant parents. The court held that
since there was no showing of anyone of the faith of the mother
available to adopt the child, it would not be "practicable" to
limit custody only to persons of that faith. In the present case
the court heard testimony to the effect that there were suitable
Catholic parents in the area, ready and willing to adopt Catholic
children. The court ruled that there was a sufficient showing
to satisfy the statute and, on the strength thereof, refused the
petition for adoption. This ruling is a manifestation of the socalled "parental right" theory, i.e., that the wishes of the natural
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parents shall control. Hernandez v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 So.
641 (1905); In re McConnon, 60 Misc. 22, 122 N.Y. Supp. 590
(Surr. Ct. 1908); Palm v. Smith, 183 Ore. 617, 195 P.2d 708
(1948). This theory is followed in In re Santos, 279 App. Div.
373, 105 N.Y.S2d 716, (1st Dep't 1951),appeal dismissed for want
of jurisdiction, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952), where two
children were placed with a Jewish woman by their Catholic
mother; after the children had been moved to a Jewish children's
institution, their natural mother, two years later, sought to have
the children transferred to a Catholic adoption agency. The New
York court, relying largely upon the parental right theory,
granted the petition.
All of the states have legislation covering the general field of
guardianship, custody and adoption. The majority of the states
have statutes similar to the Massachusetts statute with reference
to guardianship and custody. See Note, 54 COLUM. L. Rsv. 396
(1954). The District of Columbia statute is representative.
D.C. CODE § 918 (1951) It reads in part that a child when being
placed for guardianship or custody shall, when practicable, be
placed with a person, or an institution or agency governed by
persons of like religious faith. It states further that if there be
a difference in the religious faith of the parents, then the religious
faith of the child shall control, or if the religious faith of the
child is not ascertained, then that of either of the parents. The
states that do have adoption statutes, mention religion merely
as one of several considerations. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 6863 (Supp. 1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-411 (Supp. 1951); omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 31.0705 (15) (1953). Delaware and Rhode Island,
however, have statutes comparable to the Massachusetts statute,
but leave no question to be resolved. The Delaware statute, DEL.
CODE ANN. Tit. 13, § 911 (1953), specifically adheres to the parental right theory.
Religious Affiliations: No child born out of wedlock shall be

placed for adoption unless at least one of the prospective adopting
parents shall be of the same religion as the natural mother, or of
the religion in which she has reared the child or allowed it to be
reared....

See also R.I. PUB LAWS C. 1772, § 1 (1946).
There have been various interpretations of these statutes, but
in the final analysis the majority of the courts look to the best
interests of the child. In re Clark's Adoption, 38 Ariz. 481, 1
P.2d 112 (1931); In re Barkholder's Adoption, 211 Iowa 1222,
237 N.W. 702 (1930); In re MacFarland, 223 Mo. App. 826, 12
S.W.2d 523 (1928). The courts have given different estimates to
the "best interests" standard. A widely reached conclusion is
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that the child shall be awarded on the condition that it be raised
in the faith of its natural parents regardless of the religion of
the adopting parents. -Inre Bynum's Estate, 72 Cal. App. 2d 120,
164 P.2d 25 (1945); Accord, Lemke v. Gultiman, 105 Neb. 251,
181 N.W. 132 (1920). But see In re Flynn, 87 N.J. Eq. 413, 100
Atl. 861, 865 (Ch. 1917). Another conclusion is that the religion
of the child is subordinated, the result being that the award is
made to the petitioner who offers the best opportunity of material
well being. Estate of Walsh, 114 Cal. App. 2d 82, 249 P.2d 578
(1952); Oelberman Adoption Case, 167 Pa. Super. 407, 74 A.2d
790 (1950). The courts are free to arrive at these varying decisions through their interpretation of the statutes and in particular
the use of the words "shall" and "will" as merely advisory rather
than mandatory. In some cases the courts have done this to
assure the constitutionality of their statutes in face of objections
that such a statutory mandate seeks to establish a religion. In re
Walsh's Estate, 100 Cal. App.2d 194, 223 P.2d 322 (1950); State
ex rel Lutheran Society v. White, 123 Minn. 508, 144 N.W. 119
(1913).
Petitioners in the instant case sought to attack the validity of
the Massachusetts statute as a violation of the first amendment
to the Constitution, relying generally upon Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952). In support of this contention would be the
ruling in Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), where
a statute forbidding marriages between the races was termed a
violation of the fourteenth amendment and its equal protection
clause. The court in the instant case ruled that the statute was
not unconstitutional as an aid to the establishment of religion.
Religious authorities differ on their views in regards to this
problem. The Catholic church, Canon 2319 § 4, takes the position that members of the Catholic faith have an obligation to see
that their children are raised in the Catholic church. Generally, the
Protestant viewpoint holds that if the child has reached the age of
reason, he should remain with the religion that has been taught
to him. If he has not reached the age of reason, they believe
that the child may be awarded to whomever offers him security,
the faith of the natural mother not controlling. See Note, 28
IT. L. J. 401,405 (1953).
It is submitted that when children are removed from their
mother, the prospective adopting parents are aware of, or should
be aware of the existing law. When the law clearly states that
children shall be awarded to persons, whenever practicable, of
a like faith of that of the natural mother, the plea of hardship
on the child is of little merit if it was deliberately created by the
moving party. A contrary rule would sanction persons who
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would take a child for the express purpose of raising it in a faith
different from that of its natural parents and with the intent to
file for adoption papers after enough time had passed so that the
hardship of the child claim could be made. The statute was
passed in recognition of a parental right. The courts should recognize the wisdom of the legislature and not the "created" exception to the law.
Lawrence J. Dolan

EVIDENCE

-

SEARCH AND SEIZURE -

State, . . . Ind. .

. ..

AUTOMOBILES. -

Idol v.

119 N.E.2d 428 (1954). This was an ap-

peal before the Supreme Court of Indiana from a conviction
for reckless homicide and for leaving the scene of an accident. The appellant, while driving, had struck a pedestrian
crossing in the middle of the block and failed to stop. He drove
directly from the scene of the accident to the fraternity house
where he was living and put his car in the garage connected
therewith. The following day two police officers, while seeking
the bit-and-run vehicle, looked into the garage, and there seeing
appellant's automobile, broke into the garage to make a closer
examination. Not having made an arrest or obtained a search
warrant, but being satisfied that they had located the automobile
sought, the officers then went to the fraternity house and obtained permission from the house manager to enter the garage.
During this second entry the officers gathered evidence which
was later used at the trial to identify the hit-and-run vehicle as
appellant's. On this appeal the trial court's admission of this
evidence was held to be error on the ground that it was obtained
in violation of the state constitution. IND. CONST. Art. 1, § 11:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure, shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

The court refused the application of a general exception where
automobiles are involved, in which cases the above constitutional
requirement of a search warrant is frequently dispensed. The
court thus pointed up the question as to when the elusive nature
of automobiles justifies an exception to the more general rule
that a search warrant must be obtained.
The search and seizure provisions of all the state constitutions
are the same or substantially the same as those of the fourth
amendment to the Federal Constitution. However, among the
states there are two widely divergent views on the application
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of these provisions where the admissibility of evidence is questioned. One view admits evidence in a criminal prosecution
regardless of how obtained, Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So.
293 (1921), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 736 (1922); People v. Mayen,
188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922), while the other refuses to admit
evidence which is illegally obtained. The latter view is the one
adhered to by the federal courts, in turn, followed closely by
Indiana and other states. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E. 817 (1923);
Tucker v. State, 128 Mliss. 211, 90 So. 845 (1922); State v. Wills,
91 W.Va. 659, 114, S.E. 261 (1922).
In the federal courts the leading case on search and seizure is
Carroll v. United States, supra. The court there outlined the
general rule: 267 U.S. at 153,
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,

and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.

In the Carroll case, supra, federal prohibition agents without
a warrant had stopped and searched a car and found it to be
carrying illegal liquor. In holding there was no violation of the
search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment to the
Constitution, the court required only that the seizing officer shall
have "reasonable or probable cause" for search. "Probable
cause" has been described as that which would cause a prudent
and careful person, having a due regard for the rights of others,
to believe that an unlawful act has been or is being committed.
People v. Younger, 327 Mich. 410, 42 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1950).
It has come to mean more than mere suspicion. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); and where the facts are
uncontroverted, the existence of probable cause is a judicial
question. Jenkins v. State, 116 Tex. App. 374, 32 S.W.2d 848
(1930).
In the principal case the, court found no evidence to support
probable cause for search, and emphasized the fact that the
circumstances failed to justify a belief that delay to obtain a
warrant would make the search impracticable or impossible.
This test of practicability is the older view which was adopted
in the federal courts by the decision in the Carroll case, supra.
In the case of Boyd v. State, 206 Miss. 573, 40 So. 2d 303 (1949),
the principle of practicability raid down by the federal. courts
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was followed in a situation where illegal whiskey was discovered
in a car parked in a garage on defendant's premises. The search
warrant relied upon by the officers was later found to be defective, so the prosecution attempted to justify the search by a
statute which authorized the search of an automobile without
a warrant. The court determined there was probable cause, but
nevertheless held that it was still possible to obtain a warrant
because seclusion of the automobile was not imminent; the statute was never intended to permit an officer to invade the "private premises of a defendant without a search warrant and search
an automobile in his garage after the same has come to rest...."
40 So. 2d at 306. This case rests at least partially upon the fact
that the vehicle was no longer in motion, and in that regard can
be distinguished from the Carroll case, supra. Thai factor also
initiates a new consideration in the judgment on the admissibility
of evidence obtained by search and seizure.
The test of the practicability of obtaining a warrant was emphasized in the case of United States v. Nichols, 78 F. Supp. 483
(W.D. Ark. 1948), affd, 176 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1948), where it
was said that in every case where it is reasonably practicable
to obtain a search warrant, the same must be procured, but the
court added that it was a rare case indeed where it would be
reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant to search an automobile.
The decisions in the Boyd and Nichols cases, supra, are either
expressly or impliedly based upon the practicability test, but the
federal courts since the Nichols case, supra, have come to construe the proper basis for a search as its reasonableness under
all the circumstances, as opposed to the practicability of obtaining
a warrant. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The
Rabinowitz case expressly overruled the earlier case of Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1949), in so far as it required
a search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of
procuring it. This holding was extended in the case of Johnson
v. United States, 199 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 905 (1953), where the district court said: 199 F.2d at 233,
But to the extent that such cases [Carroll and Trupiano cases,
supra] stress the practicability of obtaining a search warrant
prior to the search, they have been supplanted by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States
v. Rabinowitz [citation omitted] which held that the test was the
reasonableness of the particular search, viewed in the light of all
the facts and circumstances of the case.

The theory of the Rabinowitz case, supra, concerning the principles applicable to the admission of evidence in search and
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seizure cases is being accepted by the state courts, Boyd v. State,
supra, and the federal courts, Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d
893, 897 (5th Cir. 1954). Here again in the latter case, where
there was likelihood that an automobile would not be disturbed,
the court found this factor significant in deciding whether or not
a warrant was necessary. This consideration is ultimately one of
reasonableness, and the courts, both state and federal, are
approaching it as the basis for their test of the admissibility of
evidence.
The court in the instant case placed importance on the practical effects of delay to secure a warrant. Actually, any inquiry
into the sufficiency of time can be resolved only by determining
whether the auto is likely to be moved. In this regard the instant
case is consistent with the recent trend of the decisions in so far
as it emphasizes the practicability of delay. Unfortunately, however, the court gives no concrete expression of a rule of law.
It is difficult to derive from the cases any definite principle
on which the many jurisdictions can resolve their conflicting
views. However, this writer believes that the trend is in the
direction of the most recent federal cases, i.e., placing the emphasis on reasonableness as the proper basis.
The problem as to when an automobile may be searched without a warrant is an acute and everpresent one for law enforcement officers since they determine at their own risk the reasonableness of a search without a warrant. United States v. Kaplan,
286 F. 963, 973 (S.D. Ga. 1923); and in all states they are liable
to civil suit for an illegal search. State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St.
166, 2 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1936). Thus it is essential that they be
given a solid basic principle as a guide. The federal courts, in
applying the standard of reasonableness, have employed the most
workable test, both from the standpoint of the citizen's protection
and the enforcement officer's freedom, and it is suggested that
this standard be uniformly applied by all the states, even those
not adopting the probable cause doctrine. But the standard, whatever it is resolved to be, must be definite and certain in order
to insure satisfactory enforcement of the law.
Edward J. Griffln
INSURANcE-CONTRIBUTION-INSURERS OF JoINT TORT-FEASORS
NEGLIGENT. - American Employers' Insurance

CONCURRENTLY

Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 218 F. 2d 335 (4th
Cir. 1954). This action arose out of a collision of vehicles in Virginia. One Arrington drove a tractor-trailer owned -by his
employer, Frye, and insured by the plaintiff; while one Fountain
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drove an automobile insured by the defendant. These drivers
were among several involved in the collision and judgments were
obtained against them as joint tort-feasors by or on behalf of
certain persons who were killed or injured. Plaintiff-insurer
made full payment in satisfaction of these judgments and thereafter sought contribution by bringing suit in the federal district
court.
The statutory basis of this suit was VA. coDE § 8-627 (1950)
which modifies the common law and provides for contribution
among wrongdoers where the wrong is a mere act of negligence
involving no moral turpitude. The issue before trial court was
whether the insurer of one joint tort-feasor may, by this statute,
have contribution from the other joint tort-feasor's insurer.
The court held that such action was proper according to local
law and entered judgment awarding contribution. On appeal the
court of appeals affirmed for the reasons that: (1) Virginia
statutory law allows contribution among joint wrongdoers in
pari delicta; (2) the Supreme Court of Virginia has allowed,
in an analogous case involving this same statute, an insured joint
tort-feasor, having satisfied judgment, to sue the other alleged
joint tort-feasor for contribution for the insurer's benefit. McKay
v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 S.E. 2d 121 (1950);
and (3) Virginia has also a liberal policy in allowing subrogation.
The court held that even though Virginia had not heretofore
passed on this specific issue, it was in harmony with the law
of Virginia to allow the insurer-subrogee of the joint tort-feasor,
who has paid the full judgment, to sue in his own name for contribution. Therefore the court also permitted the insurer of the noncontributing joint tort-feasor to be subrogated and be sued for
contribution in its own name.
This liberality is in accord with the modern trend, as expressed
by the court in American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Line,
179 F.2d 7, 9 (10th Cir. 1949):
Ordinarily when a public liability insurance company fully reimburses its insured for losses . . . it becomes subrogated to the

rights of the insured against third parties whose tortious conduct
caused the loss. .

.

. Where such total subrogation occurred at

common law, the action to enforce the insurer's rights had to be
brought in the name of the insured. . . . On the other hand, in
suits in equity or admiralty, the fully subrogated insurer sued in
his own name. ... Under modern statutes abolishing the distinction between law and equity ... it is generally held that an insured who had been paid in full by his insurer is not the real party
in interest, and is not entitled to bring an action in his own name
against the third party tort-feasor.. . the action must be brought by
the insurer ....

Subrogation is a normal incident of indemnity insurance, but
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the rights of the insurer can be defeated by some act of the
insured. New York Ins. Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176, 152 P.2d 837
(1944). Since the rights of the indemnitor are no greater than
those of the insured joint tort-feasor, Royal Indemnity Co., v.
Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930); Note, 75 A.L.R.
1486 (1930); 13 Am. JuR., Contribution § 58 (1938), and since
the right of contribution is a substantive right, the law of the
state where the injury occurred is determinative of the right to
contribution and indemnity. Spaulding v. Parry Navigation Co.,
90 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
In other words, most jurisdictions have taken the position that
the insurer of the joint tort-feasor has no better position than
the insured, where contribution has been denied the tort-feasors
themselves, Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac.
389 (1921), or where allowed, Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith,
166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926). Despite the progressively
liberal allowance of contribution among wrongdoers, allowance
in favor of a liability insurer or indemnitor of one joint tortfeasor in pari delicto has been consistently denied by the weight
of authority. Adams v. White Bus Line, supra; Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 211 N.C.
13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936); United States Cas. Co. V. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 129 Ohio St. 391, 195 N.E. 850 (1935). But in the case
of joint tort-feasors of unequal fault, such as principal and agent,
each insured by individual insurers, where the agent is the active
tort-feasor, indemnity has been allowed between insurers. Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. London and Lancashire Indemnity
Co., 181 Wash. 353, 43 P.2d 12 (1935). However, one who is a
mere stranger or volunteer in payment, being under no legal
obligation to pay and having no interest menaced by the continued existence of the debt, cannot receive a decree of subrogation. Schmid v. First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 130 N.J.
Eq. 254, 22 A.2d 246 (1941).
Connecticut, Dist. of Columbia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mfinnesota and Wisconsin allow in an action for contribution as plaintiff
an insurer-subrogee where the joint tort-feasors are concurrently negligent. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Employers Mutual Liability
Co., 208 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Owenboro Milling Co., 15 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Silver
Fleet Motor Express v. Zody, 43 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1952);
Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 2d 208 (1933); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, supra; Western Cas. & Surety Co. v.
Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251 N.W. 491 (1933).
Pursuant to the Western Casualty case, supra, Wisconsin allows
one insurer-subrogee to sue the other joint tort-feasor's insurer.
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But a strict view of statutes allowing contribution among joint
tort-feasors has been held not to include their respective insurers
because such parties are not specifically enumerated. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936). Contra: Silver Fleet Motor Express v. Zocdy, supra. Other states formally allow the insurer his
right to subrogation, but hold that the insurer-subrogee stands
in the shoes of the joint tort-feasor in pari delicto and cannot
recover contribution. See Jackman v. Jones, 198 Ore. 564, 258
P.2d 133 (1953).
The general rule at common law is that there is no contribution
between joint tort-feasors. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186,
101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). In England, the rule which prohibited
contribution was confined to those cases wherein a joint wrong
was confessedly intentional. See Reath, Contribution Between
Persons Jointly Charged For Negligence, 12 HARv. L. REv. 176
(1898). This rule was followed in the United States, Hunt v.
Lane, 9 Ind. 248 (1857), but, as in England, it was held inapplicable where the tort previously committed by the claimant
was a matter of negligence or mistake, Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones"
Adm'r, 1 Rand. 328, 22 Va. 122, (1823). However the rule thereafter expanded to include unintentional torts.

See PaOSSER,

TORTS 1113 (1941).
State courts generally agree that there can be no contribution
between joint wrongdoers where they, by concert of action, have
been guilty of a wilful tort, an immoral act, or were consciously
violating the law. Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 191 Tenn. 320,
232 S.W.2d 355 (1950).
Often courts have stated in broad sweeping language that the
general rule is that there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors. Spaulding v. Parry Navigation Co., supra; PROSSER,
TORTS 1111 (1941). This rule has become subject to so many
exceptions that the general rule now is that there is no right to
contribution among joint tort-feasors who are in pan delicto and
concurrently negligent. Brown Hotel Co. v. PittsburghFuel Co.,
311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165 (1949).
For example, the broad rule of no contribution among joint
tort-feasors has been held not to apply in cases of vicarious liability, United States v. Savage Truck Line, 209 F.2d 442 (4th
Cir. 1953); nor where an independent contractor was negligent,
Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316
(1896); nor where the fault of one tort-feasor was termed
passive and the other active, Gish Realty Co. v. Central City, 260
S.W.2d 946 (Ky. App. 1953); nor under workmen's compensation
statutes, United States Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J,
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157, 72 A.2d 190 (1950). These exceptions are more properly
classed as indemnity cases, shifting the loss, rather than contribution cases, sharing the loss. See Note, 37 IowA L. REv. 517 (1952).
Thus, the greater number of states apply this exclusionary no
contribution rule where there was, onrthe part of the joint tortfeasors, personal knowledge, personal participation, and personal
culpability.
Courts refer to indemnity in two principal ways: first, as an
exception to the contribution rule, and secondly, as a contract
between joint tort-feasors. Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great'
Northern Ry., 201 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953). This discussion is
concerned with the former, non-consensual indemnity. The
courts in referring to non-consensual indemnity, say that indemnity is recovering full value of what was paid out, whereas contribution is recovering one-half of what was paid out. Brown & Root
v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 261 (S.D. Tex. 1950). The
doctrine of contribution has been held more closely akin to contracts than to torts, however, and the contract statute of limitations has been held applicable. McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit
Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 S.E.2d 121 (1950). See Note, 20 A.L.R.2d 918
(1950).
The strict doctrine of the common law that there is no right
to contribution between joint tort-feasors in paH delicto where
there is actual, concurring negligence has deep roots in American
jurisprudence despite the numerous exceptions mentioned heretofore. See Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389
(1921); Gulf, M. & 0. R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 IMl.
App. 125, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951); Davis v. Lanesky, 91 -Ohio App.
125, 107 N.E.2d 919 (1951). To the contrary there are some few
jurisdictions which allow contribution among joint tort-feasors in
parn delicto despite the general rule. See Employers Mutual Cas.
Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 50 N:W.2d 689
(1951); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co.,
264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d 425 (1953). (Wisconsin rule now codified). Because Maine defines in pari delicto as an intentional or
wilful concert of action, it allows contribution if the wrongdoers
are merely negligent preferring not to posit wilfulness where the
only means of doing so would be by means of legal inference
or intendment. Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 Atl. 815 (1918).
Some require a joint judgment as a condition precedent to bringing the suit for contribution. Ankery v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33
N.W. 320 (1887); Royer v. Rasmussen, 34 N.D. 428, 158 N.W. 988
(1916); Cf., Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Milwaukee Gen.
Constr. Co., supra, where a settlement by one of the parties
is sufficient. In New York the right of contribution is con-
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ditioned on a judgment against the tort-feasors in the original
action, there being no provision for impleading. Thus the plaintiff
or injured party has sole control of the distribution of loss by
electing to bring suit against the most likely prospect. See 3
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 14.23 (2) (1st ed. 1948). New Jersey
has acknowledged the unjust result of such a procedure and now
allows contribution where only one joint tort-feasor has been
made a judgment-debtor. Bray v. Gross, 16 N.J.L. 382, 108 A.2d
850 (1954); accord, Royer v. Rasmussen, supra; see also 9
UNIFoim LAWs ANN. 153 (Cum. Supp. 50 1954). Wisconsin like-

wise merely requires common liability. This means that even
though the joint tort-feasors are not joined in a suit by an injured
party, the fact that the injured party could successfully sue any
of the joint tort-feasors, joined or not, gives rise to a common
obligation to contribute an equitable share of the common liability. Western Cas. Co. v. Milwaukee Constr. Co., supra; Mutual
Auto Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6,
66 N.W.2d 697 (1954) (allowing insurers to sue for contribution).
Accord: American Auto Ins. Co. v. Mollery, 239 Minn. 74, 57
N.W.2d 847 (1953).
Certain states have provided legislation which allows contribution among concurrently negligent joint tort-feasors in par
delicto. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 53a-1 (1952); N.Y. cIV. PRAC.
ACT § 211-a; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2103 (West 1950). Some do not
allow contribution where there is concurrent negligence. See
GA. CODE ANN.§ 105-2012 (1933).
Curious twists have developed in interpreting a few statutes.
Louisiana, allowing contribution, applies that doctrine to judgments in solido ex delicto and ex contractu. May v. Cooperative
Cab. Co., 52 So. 2d 74, (La. App. 1951). New Jersey courts are
wrestling with their contribution statute and court rules on
third-party practice in an attempt to cure apparent injustices. See
Bray v. Gross, supra. In the Bray case, supra, the court suggests
that the court rules be changed so that, under a motion to dismiss at the end of the plaintiff's case, the court may have the
authority to hold the ruling in abeyance until all of the evidence
is in. In this way, the tort liability of the defendants can be adjudged in one suit. Other courts have realized the injustice of the
no contribution rule. See Southern Ry. v. Allen, 88 Ga. App. 435,
77 S.E.2d 277, 284 and Footnote in Arizona v. United States, 214
F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1954), where the court suggested that
federal courts should lay aside otherwise controlling state law
when considering indemnity and contribution, and develop an
internal policy in their own body of law.
The court in the instant case relies on the decisions of
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Louisiana, New York and Wisconsin. These decisions were considered as having reached the desired result, that is, they each
allowed contribution to the insurers of joint tort-feasors. However, in the New York case, Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Capital
City Surety Co., 224 App. Div. 500, 231 N.Y. Supp. 169 (Ist Dept
1928), the joint tort-feasors were landlord and tenant, the plaintiff
and defendant being their respective insurers'. The factual situation
admits of active negligence and liability on the part of the tenant,
and constructive liability on the part of the landlord. Actually,
it was a suit for indemnity, not for contribution. The plaintiff
sued for the entire amount of loss, not for his equitable share
based upon the principle of contribution that one compelled to
pay more than his share of the common obligation is entitled to
contribution from other obligors who have not been compelled
to pay. The holding in this case decided the proper parties in
suits between joint tort-feasors of unequal, fault as far as indemnity is concerned.
In the Wisconsin case of Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., supra, the joint tort-feasors were concurrently negligent. The insurer of one negligent tort-feasor settled with the injured party, made a demand for contribution
from the other (alleged) joint tort-feasor and was refused. The
paying insurer sued the other joint tort-feasor and his insurer
for contribution. Wisconsin allows contribution between joint
tort-feasors in par delicto, if they are merely negligent and there
is no moral turpitude involved regardless of the release by the
plaintiff. The construction company was vicariously liable since
the employee had committed the actual negligence. In reality the
servant of the insured employer and the plaintiff's insured were
the ones in actual fault, in pari delicto. The court, for the purpose of a contribution suit, described the employer (having mere
vicarious liability) as the joint tort-feasor so that the insurer
would meet the requirements of subrogation to the rights of his
insured joint tort-feasor. Actually the court relied upon a dictum
in ConsolidatedCoach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16,
17 (1932) for this point.
The instant decision represents a result reached by the court
based on justice, unfettered by the confused and strained reasoning used by other courts that still grapple with the common
law restrictions on contribution between joint tort-feasors concurrently negligent. Though their force may well be doubted,
Lefar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-feasors, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 130, 139 & n40 (1933), the reasons given as lying behind the rule of no contribution between joint tort-feasors are its
supposed deterrent effect on the commission of joint torts and
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the traditional common law hostility toward allowing wrongdoers
access to the courts, Avery v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 221
Mo. 71, 119 S.W. 1106 (1909), similar to the policy underlying the
doctrines of contributory negligence and illegal contract.
No court has explained, and no statistics have been taken
demonstrating how the no contribution rule has deterred concurrently negligent joint tort-feasors. Furthermore, in those states
allowing such contribution, no court has explained, and no
statistics have been taken demonstrating how the no contribution
rule applied between casualty companies will deter any prospective joint tort-feasors from their misconduct. State legislatures
have the burden of changing the substantive law to allow contribution among concurrently negligent tort-feasors. Court rules
should be revised so as not to impede the progress of the substantive law in attaining the desired result, that is, equal or proportionate distribution of a common burden among those upon
whom it rests. In the instant case the court liberally applied the
principles of contribution and subrogation to achieve justice.
John W. Thornton

SALES - CONDITIONAL VENDOR AND PURCHASER - SUIT FOR
PRICE NOT CONSTITUTING AN ELECTION OF REMEDY. - SOter v.

277 P.2d 966 (1954). Subsequent to the
Snyder, . . . Utah ....
purchase of a business under a conditional sales contract, the
vendee sued to rescind the contract for alleged fraud, whereupon
the vendor denied such fraud and counterclaimed for the full
purchase price. The counterclaim was based on the vendee's
default in two payments, followed by the vendor's exercise of an
acceleration clause in the agreement. The jury found that there
was no substance to the allegation of fraud, and the court granted
judgment for the vendor on the counterclaim for the price, allowing him to retain his title until the judgment was satisfied in full.
The vendee appealed claiming error on the trial court's permitting the vendor to keep title, on the grounds that implicit
in such a judgment was the right to repossess in event of failure
to pay, and that this theory was inconsistent with the election
to sue for the price. The supreme court held that the vendor's
remedy by suing for the price did not prejudice his title, and
that he had not elected a remedy inconsistent with the retention
of title in the goods.
The question before the court was whether or not a vendor in
a conditional sales contract waives his right to reclaim the property by bringing suit for the purchase price i.e., are these rights
to be considered concurrent, or alternative and inconsistent? If
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they are concurrent, there is no waiver and a subsequent suit
may be brought; whereas, if they are inconsistent, the right to
reclaim is lost by the institution of an action on the contract. The
court in the instant case held these remedies concurrent, and in
so doing, it acknowledged the minority view.
There is a decided split of authority in those jurisdictions that
have considered this problem. The decisions that have been
reached have ultimately turned on the court's comprehension
and interpretation of the so-called doctrine of "election of
remedies."
While the states are about equally divided on this question,
the numerical weight of authority favors those decisions which
hold the remedies to be inconsistent, and, therefore, the election
of one precludes the future exercise of the other. The majority
view is expressed in Bailey v. Hervey, 135 Mass. 172 (1883),
where the vendor brought an action for the purchase price of
certain goods after the vendee defaulted on the payments. When
the judgment proved fruitless, the vendor entered the vendee's
pror'ises and took possession of the goods. The latter then brought
an action for conversion against the vendor, and the court found
for the vendee, reasoning that the vendor could not treat the
transaction both valid and invalid at the same time. If the vendor
attempts to reclaim the property, it must be on the ground that
he has elected, to repudiate the transaction. On the other hand,
if he decides to sue for the purchase price, he is deemed to have
treated the transaction as an absolute sale. The theory was that
where there are two courses of action available, the vendor must
choose which he will pursue, and having elected one, he is barred
from the other. S. F. Bowser and Co. v. Harris, 241 Ala. 113,
1 So. 2d 14 (1941); Utah Implement Vehicle Co. v. Kesler, 36
Idaho 476, 211 Pac. 1079 (1922); Galion Iron Works and Mfg.
Co. v. Service Coal Co., 264 Mich. 298, 249 N.W. 852 (1933);
and Kauffman v. International Harvester Co., 153 Fla. 188, 14
So. 2d 387 (1943).
Some courts make the manifested intention of the vendor the
test of whether or not a particular action of the vendor constitutes
a waiver. For example in Martin Music Co. v. Robb, 115 Cal.
App. 414, 1 P.2d 1000 (1931), we are told "a waiver can be inferred whenever the conduct of the seller is inconsistent with the
idea that he still intends to enforce a return of the goods ......
Inasmuch as this is a question of fact, a more definite rule cannot
be laid down. Martin Music Co. v. Robb, supra. Where the vendor manifests an intention to treat and rely upon the purchase
price as an absolute debt from the purchaser, this will be deemed
an election to waive the condition of the sale. Title will, there-
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fore, pass to the vendee, and the vendor will be precluded from
thereafter retaking the property. Yost v. May, 110 Cal. App. 2d
41, 242, P.2d 73 (1952). This theory has been followed in Massachusetts, Goublious v. Chipman, 255 Mass. 623, 152 N.E. 55
(1926), and Connecticut, Walcott v. Fallon, 118 Conn. 220, 171 Atl.
658 (1934).
A distinction sometimes made by courts adopting the majority
view, is the extent to which the plaintiff has pursued his remedy
as being a controlling factor as to whether or not there has been
an election of remedies. Some courts hold that the mere commencement of litigation constitutes an unequivocal act of election, Davidson v. McKown, 157 Kan. 217, 139 P.2d 421 (1943).
Others hold that the mere bringing of an action which is dismissed before final judgement, and in which no element of estoppel
has arisen, is not an election of remedies. Lester v. Fields, 171
Okla. 442, 43 P.2d 87 (1935); Gridley v. Ross, 37 Idaho 693, 217
Pac. 989 (1923). As a general rule, in the absence of actual
advantage to the one party or disadvantage to the other, no
binding election occurs before a decision on the merits. Williams
v. Robineau, 124 Fla. 422, 168 So. 644 (1936).
It should be emphasized that even in jurisdictions which take
the position that the remedies are inconsistent, the election must
be effectual, and, therefore, the bringing of a mistaken action,
or one against the wrong defendant, will not constitute a waiver.
Sabovrin v. Woish, 117 Vt. 94, 85 A.2d 493 (1952). A prerequisite to election is knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the
facts material to his rights. Harrison v. Miller, 124 W.Va. 550,
21 S.E.2d 674 (1942). Where a buyer of a chattel brought an
action against the seller for the purchase price on the grounds
that the seller did not have title, and later being convinced that
he had sued the wrong party, dismissed the action and sued the
original owner for possession, it was held that there was no
election of remedies. Harris v. Northwest Motor Co., 116 Wash.
412, 199 Pac. 992 (1921).
The minority viewpoint is well exemplified in Midland Loan
Finance Co. v. Osterberg, 210 Minn. 681, 275 N.W. 681 (1937).
The court said the cou~ses of action were not inconsistent, but
rather concurrent remedies, and, therefore, a suit for the purchase price was not such an election of remedies as to bar a
subsequent right of repossession. The court maintained that to
hold these remedies inconsistent is to defeat the very intention
of the parties as manifested in their contract, and added, 275
N.W. at 682:
The contract is, not that the seller shall keep the title until he
sues for the price or gets a judgment, bht that it shall remain in
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him until he gets his money. Is it not then to defeat rather than
effectuate plainly expressed contractural intention to decide that
the seller's suit for the price or a piece of it transfers title to the
buyer?

Justice Cardozo, speaking for the New York court in Ratchford v. Cayuga County Cold Storage and Warehouse Co., 217,
N.Y. 565, 112 N.E. 447 (1916), also presented the minority view
very effectively. In this case, all the payments under a condi-

tional sales contract had been paid except, the last. The vendor
sued the vendee for the last installment, but being unable to
collect the judgement, he then instituted replevin to recover the
goods. The New York court ruled for the vendor, holding that
the remedies were consistent and stating, 112 N.E. at 448:
The vendor had the right to receive the price, and brought an
action to get it. The judgment preserves the obligation of the yendee's promise to make payment, but puts it in another form. There
is no inconsistency between an attempt to get the money, and a reservation of title if the attempt is not successful.

In Murray v. McDonald, 203 Iowa 418, 212 N.W. 711 (1927),
the court relied strongly upon the above theory, in holding that
it was proper for a conditional vendor to bring an action of
replevin to recover his automobile even where a previous judgement was rendered but was not collected. The Iowa court em-.
phasized the fact that conditional sales contracts are not
illegal or contrary to public policy, and so they should be given
their intended effect.
Eleven jurisdictions have unequivocally accepted the view of
the minority by adopting the Ulimoim CoNrIONAL SALES ACT,

2 U.L.A. 6 (Cum.Supp. 1954). This act permits the vendor to
bring an action of replevin where a prior suit for the purchase price has proven fruitless. Section 24 of the Act states:
".... Neither the bringing of an action by the seller for the recov-

ery of the whole or any part of the price, nor the recovery of
judgement in such action, nor the collection of a portion of the
price, shall be deemed inconsistent with the latter retaking the
goods ......
Professor Vold (VowD, SALES 293 (1931) ) favors the minority view, reasoning that these remedies are consistent. He criticizes the opposing majority view as unrealistic, in that it assumes
the conditional sales agreement to be: ".... merely an executory

contract and to that is apparently added a further assumption
that by bringing this action for the price the conditional seller
waives his reserved title, thereby making the buyer the owner,
as it is said that on no other basis can he be entitled to recover

